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State v. Harte, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 82 (Oct. 30, 2008) 1
CRIMINAL LAW – HABEAS CORPUS/AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE IN SENTENCING
Summary
Appeal from a district court order partially granting a post-conviction petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in a death penalty case.
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed the district court order vacating Defendant’s death sentence, affirming
the guilty verdict and ordering a new penalty hearing.
Factual and Procedural History
In October 1997, Shawn Russell Harte and two codefendants, Latisha Babb and
Weston Sirex, murdered a Reno cab driver, John Castro, during the course of a robbery.
Harte subsequently admitted to sheriff’s deputies that he shot Castro in the head.
Harte, Babb and Sirex were indicted and the jury found them guilty of first-degree
murder with the use of a deadly weapon and robbery with the use of a deadly weapon.
The jury was not, however, asked to return a special verdict form indicating whether they
convicted based on the State’s willful, premeditated, and deliberate murder theory or the
State’s alternative theory of felony murder.
Harte was sentenced to death. 2 The jury found only one aggravating
circumstance: the murder was committed during the course of a robbery. The jury found
this alone outweighed any mitigating factors. Harte unsuccessfully appealed his
conviction 3 and was denied in his initial request for post-conviction relief. 4 Harte filed a
subsequent post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Harte alleged that
because the sole aggravating circumstance found by the jury was the same robbery used
to support the felony murder theory, the aggravator was invalid pursuant to McConnell v.
State. 5 As such, Harte argued he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing.
The State acknowledged McConnell and Bejarano v. State 6 may afford Harte
relief but argued that the appropriate remedy was a new trial. Harte subsequently
abandoned all claims that could result in a new trial and indicated that his focus was
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Babb and Sirex were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.
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Harte v. State, 116 Nev. 1054, 13 P.3d 420 (2000).
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Order Dismissing Appeal, Harte v. State, No. 43877 (April 7, 2005); Order Denying Rehearing, Harte v.
State, No. 43877 (May 19, 2005); Order Denying En Banc Reconsideration, Harte v. State, No. 43877
(Sept. 8, 2005).
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120 Nev. 1043, 102 P.3d 606 (2004) (holding that it is unconstitutional to base aggravating circumstance
in capital prosecution on felony that was used to obtain first-degree murder conviction), reh’g denied, 121
Nev. 25, 107 P.3d 1287 (2005); Harte also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel.
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122 Nev. 1066, 146 P.3d 265 (2006) (holding that McConnell applies retroactively).
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solely on obtaining a new penalty hearing. The district court invalidated the sole
aggravator and agreed with Harte that the appropriate remedy for a McConnell error was
a new penalty hearing. The district court vacated the death sentence, affirmed the guilty
verdict and stayed further proceedings pending this appeal.
Justice Maupin, with Chief Justice Gibbons and Justices Douglas and Cherry
concurring (Justices Hardesty, Parraguirre and Saitta concurring in the judgment)
affirmed the district court’s finding of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. The court
held the district court did not err in invalidating the sole aggravator in this case pursuant
to McConnell and that the appropriate remedy in a McConnell error case where the sole
aggravating circumstance is invalidated is a new penalty hearing and not a new trial.
Discussion
McConnell was Properly Decided
The State argued that McConnell was wrongly decided and “three major flaws” in
the decision called for its reversal:
First, the McConnell analysis begins with the definition of first-degree murder
instead of a “generic offense of felonious homicide,” the common-law definition of
murder, or even the notion of felonious murder. According to the State, this prevented
the court from recognizing that the Nevada statutory scheme genuinely narrows the class
of individuals that are eligible for the death penalty. The court in this case was not
convinced by this argument. The McConnell court relied on the analytical framework of
Lowenfield v. Phelps in determining that the narrowing function may be accomplished by
narrowly drawn definitions of capital offenses or through aggravating circumstances
found by a jury at the penalty phase. 7 The McConnell court evaluated Nevada’s capital
sentencing scheme as it applies to felony murder and found capital felony murder to be
defined broadly and the felony aggravating circumstances of NRS 200.033(4) insufficient
to genuinely narrow the class of felony murderers eligible for the death penalty. The
State did not convince the court in this case that the McConnell analysis was flawed
based on its starting definition.
Second, the McConnell analysis is based on the question of whether the statutory
aggravating circumstances “sufficiently” exclude an adequate number of murderers from
the death penalty. The State argued that the analysis should be an objective test of
whether the aggravators “genuinely” narrow the class eligible for a death sentence as put
forth in Lowenfield. The court, however, points out that the McConnell court’s analysis
began by discussing whether either of the two aggravators in that case “genuinely”
narrowed the class. 8 The analysis showed that while the two aggravators may
“theoretically” narrow the class, they did not satisfy constitutional demands because they
failed to “genuinely” narrow. 9 As such, the court concluded that McConnell used the
proper standard.
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Third, the McConnell analysis discounted the requirement that the felony
aggravating circumstance must be accompanied by certain mental states. 10 The State
argues this intent element in Nevada’s statutory scheme objectively narrows the class
eligible for the death penalty. The court, however, was not persuaded that the McConnell
analysis of the felony aggravating circumstance intent element was inadequate. The
McConnell court noted that the felony aggravating circumstance intent element (1) was
different than the intent required for a felony-murder conviction, (2) largely mirrored the
constitutional standard and did little to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty, (3) lacked the specificity of the capital felony-murder definition that met the
constitutional narrowing requirement of Lowenfield, and (4) could be overlooked and not
considered by the jury. 11 The court further considered the issue on rehearing and found
that while the felony aggravating circumstance intent element is narrower than Nevada’s
felony murder, it is still quite arguable that Nevada’s felony murder aggravator, standing
alone as a basis for seeking the death penalty, fails to genuinely narrow the class of death
eligible felony murderers. 12
As such the court held that McConnell was correctly decided and the district
court’s order relying on McConnell was proper.
A New Penalty Hearing is the Remedy under the Circumstances of this Case
The State argued the McConnell error was a charging error and was willing to
amend the charging document to remove the felony murder theory making a new trial the
appropriate remedy.
The court held that a McConnell error is not a charging error because the State is
permitted at its discretion to proceed on alternate theories supported by evidence. 13
Instead, the McConnell violation resulted in a sentencing error. The State offered no
relevant authority or cogent bases to refute the district court’s conclusion that a new
penalty hearing is the only remedy when a prejudicial McConnell error invalidates the
sole aggravator. 14
Concurrence
HARDESTY, J., with whom PARRAGUIRRE and SAITTA, JJ., agree, concurring:
Justice Hardesty concurs that a new penalty hearing is the proper remedy when
the only aggravating circumstance found by the jury is invalidated pursuant to McConnell
but believes this case reveals three fundamental flaws in McConnell’s analytical
framework:
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See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(4).
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McConnell v. State, 121 Nev. 25, 28, 107 P.3d 1287, 1289 (2005).
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Walker v. State, 116 Nev. 670, 673, 6 P.3d 477, 479 (2000).
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The remedy is a new penalty hearing unless it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that absent the invalid
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at 275-76.
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First, the Legislature has adopted a statutory scheme to narrow the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty that does not necessitate judicial expansion. 15
Second, the Legislature has narrowly defined felony murder by limiting the felonies that
subject a defendant to a first-degree murder conviction. 16 Third, there is no
constitutional, legislative, or jurisprudential basis to impose a specific intent to kill
requirement for any aggravating circumstance.
Conclusion
The court found that McConnell was correctly decided and that a new penalty
hearing is the proper remedy where the sole aggravating circumstance is invalidated. The
district court did not err in its application of McConnell or by invalidating the sole
aggravator, that “the murder was committed during the course of a robbery,” because it
was improperly based on the felony used to obtain the first-degree murder conviction.
The court therefore affirmed the district court’s order vacating Harte’s death sentence,
affirming the guilty verdict and ordering a new penalty hearing.
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